INTRODUCTION
By the time the military intervened in Turkey on 12th of September 1980, terrorism, whether from right wing or left wing, was elaiming the lıves of some twenty or more Turkish citizens every day. A1together more than 5000 people die d between 1977 and 1980. Besides ordınary citizens, a number of leading figures had been assasinated ineluding Abdi İpekçi, journalist and editor of the influential d~ily newspaper Milliyet and Prof. Dr. Nihat Erim, a former Prime Minister. Those years witnessed the bloody terrorist campaigns conducted by the Marxist-Leninist left pro-Fascist right and Marxist-Leninist Kurdish separatist groups. AIso the country was shocked by the explosion of secterian "anonymous" violence in Kahraman Maraş in December 1978which daimed more than 100lives in a particularly bloOOyepisode. Similar explosions happened in following years in Çorum, Elazığ, Malatya. Additionally some terrorist groups "liberated" several towns in Anatolia and killed those who had different political beliefs or who did not obey thern ... Why did Turkey suffer so much from terrorism? Who conducted these bloody terrorist actions? What did they want and what did they do?
In this artiele I shall try to discuss some characteristics of terrorism in Turkey. In this context I shall first attempt to underline the ideological and strategical views of the terrorist organizations and the predominant terrorists in the first and second waves of terrorism. Then I shall try to give information about the general characteristics of Turkish terrorists. The artı de wıll end with some suggestions about the future of terrorism.
i -THE FIRST WAVE OF TERRORISM IN TURKEY 1968-73 A -THE ROAD OF TERROR: FROM EXTREMIST STUDENTS TO TERRORISTS
it is generally accepted that terrorist movements in Turkey started with so-called "student mavements" in the Iate 1960s. On 12th June, The first generatian of Jeading Turki,h terrorists got organised as radical activists within the Federation of Hevolutionary Youth Associations (DEV-GENÇ), the main left wing student organization. In general they were extremist unive'r:iİt.y students and same of them, like Mahir Çayan and Sinan Cemgll, \,'ere very. promising students. From 1965 to 1969 their political activity ;:p:::ıearedto mEnifest itself through enthusiastic, idealistic youth group::. (Jp to 1969 there were same links between Turkey's only legal Marxi~,t party the Turkish Labour Party and these groups, particularly that ai' Nlahir Çayan. During this period terl'or did not appear as a significant Hem on their .ıgenda. The Turkish Labour Party's lack of succes~in the 1969 general elections proved a great dis::ıppointmeııt for Lhem an:l vıeakened their belief that a Marxist-Leninist revalutian could happeıı peacefully in rurkeT.
Coilsequently a year la ter they moved from peaceful political activities such as the organiza~jı;n of mass demonstrations and rallies against the centre -right government and NATO, and propogation of socialism among university students and workers, to urban and rural guerilla warfare. In 1969-70, before starting wide:3pread terrorism, same radical left wing students, includin g Deniz Gezmi?, Hüseyin İnan, travelled to the Palestine Liberation OrgcL:z.ation (PLO) .::amps in Jordan to be trained in guerilla warfare tactks.;; The year 1971 SölW the development of a new and very surprising pha,3e in the history oE the Turkish Republic, with the emergence of three r ıain terrorist organizations.
Organised by extremist students they .3tar1,:;dto carry ou~terrorist actions in different parts of Turkey: Mahir çayan's Turkish Feople Liberation Party-Front (TPLP-F), Deniz Gezmış's Turkish People Liberation Army (TPLA), and later İbrahim Kaypakkaya's Turkish Worker Peasant Liberation Army (TWPLA).
B -BETWEEN RURf\L AND URBAN TERRORISM
The TPLA was founded both in Ankara and İstanbul in 1969. it was. supposed to have been led by Deniz Gezmiş. However the real leader and ideologist of the group was Hüseyin İnan. 4 Despite his popularity among university students, Deniz Gezmiş was in general a militant, being far more interested in actions than in theories of revolutionary change. Sinan Cemgil's name was the second most important name in the TPLA.
The TP LA started systematic terrorist actions at the beginning of 1971. Firstly it kidnapped four American soldiers in İstanbul. This action helped to publicisize its name throughout Turkey. While a group of TPLA members continued urban terrorist actions in the big cities like Ankara and İstanbul, another group led by Sinan Cemgil met around MalatyaAkçadağ to begin rural guerilla operations. Their first aim was to destroy the Kürecik American Military Base. But they were discovered by a shepherd who informed the security forces about their existence in that area. In the ensuing battle between the group and the army units, some of the terrorists were killed while others were captured by the security forces. 5 Later three ımportant figures in the TPLA, Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan and Yusuf Aslan were arrested' in İstanbul and Sivas. After their trial they received the death penalty and were executed in 1972.
The TP LA was a Marxist-Leninist organization.
In their opinion Turkey was occupied by The USA economically, culturally, and, to a certain extent, militarilyo The country had been colonized, and was being controlled by the United States and its agents in Turkey. The electoral failure of the TPLA in the 1959 elections had made it clear that the re would. be no peaoeful means of overthrowing the establishment. There was onlyone way: "armed conflict". Having believed in the idea that "the imperialist forces" could only be destroyed by means of revolutionary violence and that "the Marxist-Leninist revolution comes from the barrel of a gun", as Mao said, they envisaged "the great victory" as being very near. According to the strategy of the TPLA for revolution, the revolutionary movement would begin in the big Cİties and then would spread from the urban areas to the rural districts. Once the action of the TPLA ATtLLA YA YLA had proved that chaIle:!1giı ıg the state was a viable proposition then popular widespread suppoJ:'" was quickly forthcoming. There is no doubt that the TPLA members ı."ere affected deeply by the success of Castro in Cuba and revolutionary struggle of Che Guevara in Bolivia. The ideologist of the group, Hı:ı.seyin İnan, tried to adopt the rural guerilla strategy formulated by Che Guevara for Turkey in his writings entitled: "The Way of the Turkish Jevolution". As would be expected, the basic conflict areas for the TPL.:!\.were the ıural districts, in particular, the territory' between Malaty;I.. Akçadağ and Adıyaman.
Guided by the writings of Che Guevara,:he leaders of the TPLA did not accept the formation of the national ,:ommunist party (as defined by Orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory) a: an essential prerequisite for revolutionary change. As they perceived: t the basic conditions for revolution existed in Turkey. Ideological conflict had to be kept in second place to the revolutionary process. The most immediate action to be taken was to organise smaIl groups for < ırrned conflict in chosen strategic areas. The second stage of the TPLA plan was to unify these smaIl guerilla groups in order to form the national revolutionaryarmy.6 This strategy, obviously, did not work and the TPL A was completely destroyed by the security forces in a short period of I.irneT he TPLP-F, the secoj:,d terrorist organization in the first wave of terrorism, was established by Mahir çayan, Ertuğrul Kürkçü, Münir Ramazan Aktolga and Yusuf ]::üpeli. This group, too, was operating within the TLP in the beginning. j!dter the faİ1ure of the TLP in the 1965 elections it broke its ties witlı the party and joined Mihri Belli, a former member of the Turkish Cor,ımunist Party and the leader of the National Democratic Revolutionary .. 1'10vement. 1'hen, in January 1971, they left Belli's group, publishing an open letter entitled "Open Letter to the Aydınlık Socialist Magazine"7, .md formed the TPLP-F as an illegal organization. The Turkish People Lil:eration Party-Front militants started to carry out terrorist actions on 12tlı Februrary, 1971, by robbing a bank in Ankara, and then killed the h'aeli Consul General. At about the same time, Mahir çayan, the leader 0" the TPLP-F, was captured by the police. While on tria.! he managed ') escape from the military prison in İ~tanbul with some other terrorists. His final actian, probably designed to secure the release of the TPLA's Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan who at that time had been sentenced to death, involved the kidnapping of three foreign hostages in Northern Anatolia. i should emphasize that this operation and the place chosen to carry it out marked a very impor-tant step in the development of Turkish terrorism. çayan and his eight friends were killed in a shooting with the security forces during this incident in May 1972 8 •.
Mahir çayan was, and still is, the most important and influential firgure in terrorist movements, not only in terms of the strategy he tried to devise, but also in terms of the examples of extreme militancy he provided by his actions. it can be said that two main factors contributed to çayan's prominence among the first and second generations of Turkish terrorists. Firstly, in contrast to Deniz Gezmiş, çayan, within his own limitations, had a remarkable intellectual capacity. He tried to devise a new theory for Turkish revolution by combining traditional Orthodox Marxist-Leninist views with the ideas of Che Guevara, Castro and Debray.9 By writing several artides about revolutionary strategy he attempted to analyse the social, cultural and military conditions of Turkey from the socialist point of wiev. His ideas affected almost all revolutionary youth movements and terrorist organizations in Turkey. Secondly, "çayan combined this intellectual orientation with a strong perchant for suicidal violence"lo. During the Iate 1960s and early 1970s in Turkey the worst insult for a leftist extremist was to be accused of being a pacifist. As Sayarı pointed out, by quating from "Ahmet Samirn", a writer who has very strong links with leftist. movements, çayan's main fear was to appear to be a pacifist. "çayan displayed a passion for weapons and a deep commitment to violent action. His death in a bloody hostage incident _ in which he urged his fellow terrorists to fight until the bitter end despite the fact that they were surrounded by a large military contingent in a remote farm house-was typical of çayan's quest for violent. tactics"ll.
The TPLP-F's ideas and its strategy for revolution were improved and subsequently expounded by Mahir çayan in his "Permanent Revolution I-II-III". çayan based his strategy on an analysis of the present situation in Turkey. it was, in his opinion, a country occupied by the United States. Obviously this was not an open occupation. Rather, the country was being governed by a reactionary government consisting of the bureaucracy and the military, both controlled by America. "Real democracy" did not exist in Turkey. The Turkish experience of democracy was similar to that of Philipines. The only method available to rid thema Uğur Mumcu, Çıkmaz Sokak, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, pp. 5-10; 11-24. selves of imperialist (Iecııpation and to establish re al democracy, ht' believed, was through rev(dution. Within the Marxist-Leninist theory, revolution couldn't be real.zed through peaceful means such as parliamentary struggles, elections and so on. The only possible way for revolution was, as Lenin and Ma(J proved, to engage in revolutionary violence. In this context, Mao's ideHo, especial1y, were very important and the Maoist conception of thE' "p :'ople's war" toak an extremly significant role in Çayanist strategyl2.
According to this v.:.ew, revolution could take place through a long, diffucult war of the people.against imperialist powers under the leadership of a strong elite gorup, Le. ,he TPLP-F. However the people's war should not be expect to begin by Li 2lf and nor should the people be expected to join the war immediately. ]rı addition the government was not as weak as some unrealistic revolut.onary gorups supposed. Due to the relative power of the capitalist~jtatı~and the temporary increase in standards of living in Turkey an "artifLal balance" had arisen between the people and the state during the HGOS.1 3 Turkey had become industrialized to a certain extent and the cor:Jnunication and transportation system s had been improved. As a result the power of the state had begun to impinge on the furthermost corners :li' the country. The central state organization became much stronger than i.: had been ten or twenty years ago. In these circumstances none of the n!\'olutionariels could imagine, that the people's war would start by itself. Vlhat was needed to bring it about was to express the "realities" to H:ı;' people and to diclose the real face of the government. To do this, thE, basic devices available to the revolutionary forces were "the armed prc paganda" and "the vanguard war"14.
Armed Propaganda included rural guerilla war and psychological war against the governmerr>:. These were to be conducted by the members of the revolutionary vanguard, namely the TPLP-F, to show that on no account was the state as slJ'ong as believed by the people. The successful campaign of violence by th: revolutionary militants would prove the possibility of challenging t:1:~state. The second stage in the process was to be the people's war. ::<'in"lIythe state would realize its incapacity for coping with the revolutional'Y forces alone and would cal1 upon the US for assistance. Through Am'o'rican intervention Turkey was to be transformed from being half-occupied to ful1y-occupieçl. Natural1y, the revolutionary forces, in this case, would have to seek help from the World • This last point, or, rather, expectation shows not only why the TPLP-F did itl ast actian in Northeast Turkey, but alsa why the terrorist organizations that falIwed the strategy of the TPLP~F paid special attentian to the same area. Because beside its extreme suitability for guerilla warfare, it had direct sea and land access to the Soviet Union. In other words, it was the most convenient place to get help from "the central power of socialist bloc."16 So, the TPLP-F envisaged a civil war based on the pattern'af Vietnam with the aim of creating a region liberated from the state which would be gradually widened: by gradual inroads into the main land. Their plan was to divide Turkey into two parts: one to be supported by the socialist bloc and the other by American capitalism and "imperialism". No need to doubt the revolutionary aim was to win this civil war and save Turkey from imperialist occupation. As expE-cted the Cuban revalutian and the adventures of Che Guevara in Latin America in 1960s affected çayan and his friends deeply and made them believe that they could succeed in Turkey. One of the leaders of the TPLP-F, Yusuf Küpeli, confirmed this by saying: "In that period of time we were considering Marighella, Lin Piao, Maa and Douglas Brava as being on apar with Lenin ... "17. " ••• There were same people who were imagining themselves in Vietnam or Cub:ı ... "n..
The plan of the TPLP-F, like that of the TPLA, did not work. Mahir çayan and eight other guerillas were killed in an armed battle with the security forces. The other members of the TPLP-F were alsa captured and jailed after triaı' By the year 1973, the TPLP-F had become a dead organization. However this was not end. After the general amnesty in 1974, more than a dozen terrorist organizations each of which daimed to be the true followers of the TPLP-F appeared all over Turkey.
The third terrorist organization between 1969-73 was the Turkish Worker Peasant Liberation Army (TWPLA). The leader of the TWPLA, İbrahim Kaypakkaya, desired to, immediately, start the guerilla war in the rural areas. For him, the masses were waiting for the armed struggle not for speech or publishing magazines l9 • it should be made dear that, in comparison with f the other terrorist organizations of the same period ..the TWPLA was the more radical and separatist. !ts strategy for revalutian
LG Ibid., p. 324. was based on Kurdism, a'"med struggle and G:he Guevara's "focoism". Kaypakkaya thought that tLı, necessary prerequisities existed in East and South Anatolia to conduct guerilla warfare. it was quite easy in these tlistriets to set up "liber:ı.tcc! red arens" and to defend the m against the state. The territory wa:; enUrely suitablE to long-term guerilla warfare :md the people living in E'.stern Anatolia could form the basis of the revolutionary guerilla JY.,OV( ;:nent's army. In other words, "the objective conditions" of the revolutic 11 existed 20 • The absence of the subjective . conditions, Le. party and re:1 army, would not matter in these circumstanees. Kaypakkaya's organ:zation was to constitute the nucleus of the red army. While it struggled against the imperialism the people would create the party and eventu.dly the red army.2I.
According to the TWI'.LA's strategy, first the local red political governments were to be set up with armed struggle in strategically important places within SoutlıE'ast Turkey. The second step was the unification of the local armed fm"cf:;to create a national united front, a regular army.Then all the large eitic!'; in Turkey would be beseiged by this army. Meanwhile in these cities the urban guerillas would organise riots, conquer the security forces and :make the job of the red army easier.
Obsiously, within this fnmework, Kaypakkaya didn't see revolution's Lanclusian as being far oH. :.:1 order to apply his ideas in real life, Kaypakkaya started to carry out nıral guerilla warfare in Southeast Anatolia after the military internn:ion of 12th March 1971. Two years later, in January 1973, the security iDrces found him and after an armed battlẽ aptured him in Tunceli, the main area of his activity. While he was being questioned on 17th May HI';:~, he, according to the police, committed suicide. According to his fri,.~ııds,however: he was tortured to death by the police 22 • Thus, by the time th~um general elections the TP LA the TPLP-F, and the TWPLA had been diminated by the security forces, prominent figures in these organizatioı::;; had been either killed, or executed, and otQer members had been j2iled. Unfortunately this was not the end of terrol'ism in Turkey. In other words, it was only the end of the first wave of terrol'İsm. Soan, in 1-:2 y"ars tim~, many new terrorist organizations would appear and present Lıemselves as fallawers of the TPLA, the TPLP-F or the TWPLA.
20 Ibid, pp. 308.310. 21 Sayılgan, op. cit., p. 561.
Ibid., p. 562.
II. THE SECOND WAVE OF TERRORISM: TERROR OR CIVlL WAR
The second wave of. terrorism in Turkey, taking place between 1975 Turkey, taking place between -1980 , differed from the first in three respects: ideological diversity, the size of terrorist organizations and the calibre of the terrorists.
\
In contrast with the three organizations of 1968-73, almost twenty terrorist organizations of both left and right wing persuasions opera te d from 1975 to 1980. Consequently the number of people who involved terrorist activity increased dramatically from several dozens to almost thirty thousand. Simultaneously, the increasing militancy of the new terrorist organizations spread from the cities to the towns. As expected, the larger the terrorist organization the less qualified its militants and the more brutal their actions. Thus Turkey underwent a unique period of terror foreing the horror struck majority to choose between an inoperalive democracy and the unity of the country.
Some twenty radical left wing organizations engaged in direct terrorist activity. Aıı these considered themselves the true followers of the TPLA, the TPLP-F and the TWPLA. Oğuzha!! Müftüoğlu, formerly a member of the TPLP-F, who was later freed during general amnesty of 1974, set up the most popular organization, the Revolutionary Path (RP) with the aid of his friends. The RP was to split into two groups in 1978 and the splinter group, led by Paşa Güven, also a former member of the Çayanist group, called itself the Revolutionary Left (RL).
Çayan's wife Gülten, who moved to Paris after the death of her husband, founded .the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Union (MLAPU) which~as to beccme one of the most bloody terrorist groups prior to 1980.
The organizations mentioned above were, by and large, ideological; ethnic separatism did not take an important place in their polieies. But some other organizations such as the Kurdistan's Worker's Party (KWP-PKK), the Kurdistan National Liberation (KNL-KUK) were basically ethnic-separatist movements. it could be said that in the second wave of Turkish terrorism the emergence of such separatist groups as these posed possibly the most serious threat to Turkish unity. The fact that some ethnic separatist organizations have been continuing to carry out terrorist activity in southeast of Turkey would seem to confirm this.
Many left wing terrorist organizations in the second wave were led by well-known former militants, who had been freed in the 1974 general amnesty. They retained the vicws of the formE::rorganizations and did not or could not produce new ideas. In addition, although they considered 258 ATİLLA YAYLA themseIves Marxist-Leninbt.. they did not share the same convictions about M-L and its revolutionary strategy and defended Enver Hocaism as well as Leninism, Staliıı;:im and Maoism. The ideas of Latin American revolutionaries such as CLe Guevara, Castro, Marighella seemed to be less important to their 'wcyof seeing revolutionary conflict, and they preferred to concentrate their so-called intellectual activities on the ınterpretation of Orthodox M-L.
The largest organi2;ati<ln which grew out of the TPLP-F, the Revolutionary Path, focussed it:> activities in Northeast AnatoHa, particularly iıı Fatsa as had its predeces50r. The RP wanted to establish a prototype organization for the futun~; in their own words, "to establih a rival authority in opposition to eeııtral government power". The capture of the Iocal government office uC Mayor facilitated their activities, in turn broadening their range of influence. The prototype political authority set up by the RP establisl:.ecl itself administratively through local government. Those who ventııred to oppose or challenge the totalitarian authority of the RP in local. government were immediately neutralized through intimidation, eoer ::ion or physi<:ally liquidation.
Until central government initiated "üpenı;ion pinpoint" in the area which was carried out by the police and arm:! the RP ruled the local area unchallenged by organizing local judicıay bodies to prosecute those who dared oppo:;e its power ... Unlike their predec:essı:rs the left wing terl'or organizations of the second wave intensifieel their activity in the large cities. Not only did they use violence agairıst .:rificials and security forces', but also against their own rival organi,:ati(Jns of the left as well as against right wing extremists. Not surprisi.ngl i~, from time to time, terrorists were violent amongst themselves, again~~ttheir fellow militants in the name of organizational diseipline and ic:,:::ological purity.
The Idealist Youth Mcıement (IYM) appeared to be the main right wing terrorist organization during the period leading up to 1980. Despite ıts appearance as a separa le-independent organization, it was ,in fact, a front organization for tlw extreme-right wing National Action Party (NAP) and it was controıı(~d by the leader of the party, Alpaslan Türkeş. Till 1977 the IYM was comidered to be a reactionary movement against the inereasing number of ldt wing group s and. the threat of communism. !ts stated aim was to aBsist the state against the communist threat. After staying a relatively smail ınüvement until 1977, the IYM started to grow rapidly when the National Actian Party became a partner of the coalition government led by Süleyman DemireL. In these eircumstances it was !.ransformed from being an 'moHical political instrument to an organizatıon that slowly began to dominate the state. During the Republican People's Party years of office under the leadersihp of Bülent Ecevit, the IYM lost its influential position within state affairs, but started to gain the support of the many middle-çlass people who were afraid of the extreme left wing movements which also used some state facilities in 1973-79.
The ideological appearance of the IYM was not conveyed very clearly. it could be said that in fact it did not posess a clear and complex ideology. . Alpaslan Türkeş tried to. devise an eclectic ideological stance both for the NAP and the IYM. The so-called doctrine he tried to expound consis1ed i)f diften~ııt idea" borrowed from diverse ideologies includiııg socialism as well as fascism. He ealled his doctrine "9 lights". In general, the ideology of IYM was based upon Turkish nationalism, coIlectivism, anti-communism and admiration of the state. At that time Islam did not play a significant role in their way of thinking. But in 1980 the ir world view began to change and Islam became the predominant factor in the ideology of IYM.
In the same year their most popular slogan was: "Islam is victorius even our blood is shed". So their aim changedfrom assistance to the state in its struggle against communism to fighting to establish "the holy order of the world' (nizam-ı alem). In accordance with this change, instead of "9lights':, they tended to talk about "the idea of holy world order" (nizam-ı alem ülküsü), and in the ir publications they were projected as the defenders of holy Islamic ideas .
. The Raiders Association (RA) was bom as the second right wing terrorist organization in 1980.Being the youth organization of the National Salvation Party (NSP) it accepted Islam as a total ideologyand followed the idea of Islamic revolution. it is not unfair to say that the Islamic revolution of Iran that tookplace İn 1979 deeply aff~cted the RA. This _ view is strengthened by the fact of its Iate apperance despite the exıstence of the NSP as a relatively strong political party from 1973 to 1980.
As has already been said the RA interpreted Islam as a universal ideologyand rejected all "Western ideas"including nationalism and democracy. What it wanted. was a pure Islamic regime far removed from all the "wıckedness" of modern culture. The ideologists of this fundamentalist movement saw left wing ideas as being closer to their own than those of IYM. They opposed the current political regime and in this sense they were also revolutionary. Since it has only been existence for a short while, the RA did not develop particular pattern of violence. However, not surprisingly, despite being a right wing group it generally chashed with IYM militants and in some areas co-operated with left wing organizations against the IYM.
III. THE GENERAL I'ROFILE OF TURKISH TERRORISTS
. Not surprisingly in thE' first wave of terrorism in Turkey virtually all of the terrorists were, ty Turkish standards, well educated university students. This is not stranqe when we remember the similarities with Western countries. In 1968, all student movements in the West were led by the students affected by the ideas of the new left wing thinkers, especially H. Marcuse. In e.:mtrast, Marcuse, as was pointed out, did not affect Turkish students, be ::ause. probably, Turkey was not a developed consuption society. Inste'ad of Marcuse, Turkish students were influenced by Lenin, Maa and partly by Che Guevara, Castro and Debray ... Thus, Turkish students, differing from the ir contemporary students in the West whose main activities were to organise rallies and mass demonstrations, chose to set up sınal] armed groups to fight against the state. So, all levels of the terrorist or,;,;mizations, especially the ranks of leadership, were filled by the student:ö... Mahir çayan, Hüseyin jnan and İbrahim~aypakkaya were university students when they estLbli: hed and led the ir organizations. And so were the ir closest colleagues. sud. :ıs Yusuf Küpeli, Sinan Cemigil, Yusuf Aslaıı and so on. They used th(~universities, particularly the Middle East Te-:hııical Universityand .a€;
Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University, as their headqu n'ters, l"ew offieers or mılitary students held ranks in the terrorist orgar.izations like Orhan Savaşçı, çayan's brother in law, and Satfet Alp. 'fhı' terrorists in the first wave who were later to be known as the 194.' generatian were in general in their 20s. On thf: whol~they came from ınick le or upper class families. For same of them their farnilies played a sigııificant role in their political orientation like Sinan Cemgil, whose fatiler Adnan Cemgil was a well-known name of the socialist movement. Othe:rs ,,"ere greatly affected by the left wing publications that boomed af ter the 1961 constitu1.İon.
In the second wave of':errorism the basic characteristics of the terro:ı:-istschanged in several r-ı!spects.The leaders of the organizations were no longer students. Either they had finished or they left the university afLer wastıng their time in ..ı~ounııecessary "capitallsı" educaLian proce;:;3. The most significant pee>ple in the neworganizations were in general former members of the fir;;'.~three groups of the first wave. Despite the appearance of several new' pmminent names within the terrorist organizations of the second wave, for.mer iigures maintained their leading posıtions. The lower echelons of the '.errorist organizitions generally included students, officials, workers and unemployed people. According to a survey condueted on 820 terrorists rl'om both left and right organizations, 35 %
